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A Précis of On Global Justice, 
With Emphasis on Implications for International Institutions 
Mathias Risse, Harvard University 
October 9, 2012 
l. In an increasingly politically and economically interconnected world, it is hard to ascertain 
what justice requires.
1 It is difficult to spell out how principles of justice apply, to begin with, 
and hard to assess what they entail for pressing political questions ranging from immigration to 
trade and climate change. The two traditional ways of thinking about justice at the global level 
either limit the applicability of justice to states -- the only distributions that can be just or unjust, 
strictly speaking, are within the state -- or else extend it to all human beings. The view I defend 
in On Global Justice (Princeton University Press, 2012) rejects both of these approaches and 
instead recognizes different considerations or conditions based on which individuals are in the 
scope of different principles of justice.  Finding a philosophically convincing alternative to those 
approaches is the most demanding and important challenge contemporary political philosophy 
faces, one that in turn reflects the significance of the political issues that are at stake. 
My  own  view,  and  thus  my  attempt  at  meeting  the  aforementioned  challenge, 
acknowledges the existence of multiple grounds of justice. On Global Justice seeks to present a 
foundational theory that makes it plausible that there could be multiple grounds of justice and to 
defend  a  specific  view  of  the  grounds  I  call  internationalism  or  pluralist  internationalism. 
Internationalism grants particular normative relevance to the state but qualifies this relevance by 
embedding the state into other grounds that are associated with their own principles of justice 
and that thus  impose  additional obligations  on those who share membership in  a state.  The 
grounds I discuss are shared membership in a state, common humanity, shared membership in 
the global order, shared involvement with the global trading system and humanity’s collective 
ownership  of  the  earth.  Other  than  shared  membership  in  a  state,  it  is  humanity’s  common 
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ownership of the earth that receives the most sustained treatment. And it is probably in the 
conceptualization of common ownership as a ground of justice that my view seems strangest. 
To demonstrate its philosophical fruitfulness, the book develops my view for a broad 
range of topics, including immigration, fairness in trade, and obligations resulting from climate 
change, but  also  human rights, obligations to  future  generations,  among others.   On Global 
Justice does not explore familiar questions about the state’s constitution and internal structure 
beyond what is required to show that shared membership in a state is a ground of justice to which 
particular principles of justice apply. I inquire about the state only in a global perspective. The 
book is about global justice as a philosophical problem, and about political problems on which 
principles of justice bear at the global level. Nonetheless, my view does regard the state as 
special  within  a  theory  of  global  justice,  and  this  distinguishes  my  approach  from  more 
cosmopolitan approaches. 
  On Global Justice is meant to exemplify the kind of work philosophers can, and must, do 
to  help  solve  the  world’s  political  and  economic  problems,  including  problems  raised  by 
globalization. Attempts at solving such problems inevitably lead to questions about what kind of 
world we should have. Philosophical inquiry rarely leads to concrete policy advice unless much 
of  what  most  people  currently  believe  and  much  of  how  our  institutions  work  is  taken  as 
constraining what such advice could look like. Nonetheless, we need visions for the future of the 
world. If such visions try to dispense with political philosophy, they forfeit conceptual tools that 
are plainly needed to develop and defend them. At the same time, political thought that proceeds 
with too little connection to the problems that preoccupy those who want to change the world 
often  is  complacent  and  boring,  as  is  philosophical  inquiry  that  mostly  investigates  its  own 
nature and thinks of political discourse only as one source of input for metaethical analysis. 
This précis offers an outline of central themes in On Global Justice to help make the 
book  accessible.  This  article  puts  special  emphasis  on  what  my  approach  implies  for 
international institutions. The book offers plenty of references to connect my work to the thought 
of others, but here I do little of that sort. And as is in the nature of a précis, more often than not I 
fail to pause and explain definitions in detail and state arguments at appropriate length. That is 
what the book is for. I also develop some of the major themes of On Global Justice in another 
book. Global Political Philosophy (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) is an introduction to political 
philosophy.  Most  such  introductions  start  with  questions  about  the  state,  stay  with  such 3 
 
questions, and then add a chapter or two about global issues. This book proceeds the other way 
round, beginning at the global level and addressing questions about the state where appropriate. 
While Global Political Philosophy is meant to be a kind of textbook it takes a view on the issues 
discussed, and so, unsurprisingly, it also ends up advocating pluralist internationalism.  
 
2. The most striking fact about the political organization of humanity in the modern era is that we 
live  in  states.  States  are  organized  societies  with  a  government  and  a  territory.  The  state’s 
territory is  a  region where the  government  can successfully  enforce its  rules  because it can 
generally  physically  overpower  internal  competitors  and  discourage  aggression  by  outsiders. 
Needless to say, many countries in Africa, Central and South America, Western and Southern 
Asia, and Eastern Europe have low state capabilities, in a number of cases so low that they are 
sometimes called ―quasi-states.‖ And of course, other political arrangements are possible and 
have existed historically. Political organizations that predate states include city-states (which 
lack the territorial aspect of states), city leagues, empires (which lack the relatively tight and 
unified organizational structure of states), or feudal structures (which normally include complex 
internal structures). In a world of increasing political and economic interconnectedness debatable 
(if perhaps not politically realistic) alternatives to the state system include a world state, a world 
with federative structures stronger than the United Nations, one with a more comprehensive 
system of collective security, one where jurisdictions are disaggregated, or one where border 
control is collectively administered or abandoned entirely. Reflection on such structures matters 
greatly in an interconnected world where enormous differences in life prospects persist.  
Nonetheless, it is the state that has been the politically dominant mode of organization in 
recent centuries. Two central philosophical questions arise about the state: whether its existence 
can be justified to its citizens to begin with, and what is a just distribution of goods within it. As 
far as the first question is concerned, philosophers from Thomas Hobbes onward have focused 
on  rebutting  the  philosophical  anarchist,  who  rejects  the  concentrated  power  of  the  state  as 
illegitimate. For both sides of the debate, however, the presumption has been that those to whom 
state power had to be justified were those living within its frontiers. The question of justice, too, 
has been much on the agenda since Hobbes, but it gained centrality in the last fifty years, in part 
because of the rejuvenating effect of John Rawls’s 1971 A Theory of Justice. It is because of his 
focus on the state that Hobbes got to set much of the agenda for subsequent political philosophy. 4 
 
And that emphasis was preserved (at least initially) when Rawls did so much to renew debates in 
political philosophy.  
However, real-world changes, grouped together under the label ―globalization,‖ have in 
recent decades forced philosophers to broaden their focus. In a world in which goods and people 
cross borders routinely, philosophers have had to consider whether the existence of state power 
can be justified not merely to people living within a given state but also to people excluded from 
it (e.g., by border controls). At a time when states share the world stage with a network of 
treaties and global institutions, philosophers have had to consider not only whether the state can 
be justified to those living under it but whether the whole global political and economic order 
consisting of multiple states and global institutions can be justified to those living under it. And 
in  a  world  in  which  the  most  salient  inequalities  are  not  within  states  but  among  them, 
philosophers have had to broaden their focus for justice, too, asking not only what counts as a 
just distribution within the state but also what counts as a just distribution globally. 
In what follows ―justice‖ will always be ―distributive justice.‖ A theory of distributive 
justice explains why certain individuals have particularly stringent claims to certain relative or 
absolute  shares,  quantities,  or  amounts  of  something.  In  Shakespeare’s  Merchant  of  Venice, 
Shylock makes his demand for a pound of his delinquent debtor’s flesh in terms of justice, and 
until the clever Portia finds a device for voiding the contract, the presumption is that it must be 
granted. Kant went too far when he insisted that without justice life was not worth living at all, 
but in any event, demands of justice are the hardest to overrule or suspend. Justice plays its 
central  role in  human affairs  precisely  because it enables persons to  present  claims of such 
stringency.  
Consider now some distinctions that characterize much of the current debate about justice 
at the global level but that, as we will see, pluralist internationalism transcends. Distributive 
justice  is  the  genus  of  which  relationism  and  nonrelationism  are  species.  Relationists  and 
nonrelationists disagree about the grounds of justice. The grounds of justice are the features of 
the population (exclusively held) that make it the case that the principles of justice hold within 
that  population.  ―Relationists‖  about  the  grounds  of  justice  apply  principles  of  justice  only 
among  individuals  who  stand  in  a  certain  essentially  practice-mediated  relation;  ―non-
relationists‖ account for principles of justice without recourse to such relations.  A reference to 
practices keeps nonrelationism from collapsing into relationism. The relation of ―being within 5 
 
100,000 kilometers of each other‖ is not essentially practice-mediated, nor is, more relevantly, 
that of ―being a fellow human.‖  
Relationists may hold a range of views about the nature of the relevant relations, and they 
may think there is only one relational ground or several. Relationists are motivated by concerns 
about ―relevance,‖ the moral relevance of practices in which certain individuals stand. Such 
practices may include not only those that individuals chose to adopt but also some in which they 
have never chosen to participate. Nonrelationists deny that the truth about justice depends on 
relations. They think principles of justice depend on features that are shared by all members of 
the  global  population,  independent  of  whatever  relations  they  happen  to  be  in.  Rather  than 
focusing on relevance, nonrelationists seek to avoid the ―arbitrariness‖ of restricting justice to 
regulating practices. Globalization may have drawn our attention to the fact that justice applies 
globally, say the nonrelationists, but in fact it always did. 
―Globalists‖  are  relationists  who  think  the  relevant  relation  holds  among  all  human 
beings; ―statists‖ think it holds among those who share a state.  Globalists think there is only one 
relevant relation, and that relation holds among all human beings in virtue of there being a global 
order.  (To  remember  its  relationist  meaning,  readers  should  connote  this  term  with  global 
political  and  economic  order  rather  than  with  globe.)  Statists,  too,  think  there  is  only  one 
relevant relation, and think that relation holds (only) among individuals who share membership 
in  a  state.  Statists  endorse  what  I  call  the  normative  peculiarity  of  the  state;  globalists  and 
nonrelationists deny it. However, nonrelationists agree with statists and globalist that there is 
only one ground of justice. Offering a theory of justice then means to assess what the uniquely 
determined ground of justice is and then to assess what principles apply to relevant populations.   
 
3.  Statists  and  globalists  disagree  about  what  relation  is  relevant  for  the  applicability  of 
principles  of  justice.  Nonetheless,  they  both  are  relationists,  resting  claims  of  justice  on 
nationally  or  globally  shared  practices,  respectively,  and  thus  to  some  extent  use  similar 
arguments to defend their views. Globalists owe an account of what it is about involvement with, 
or subjection to, the global order that generates demands of justice. Statists owe an account of 
what it is (exclusively) about shared membership in states that generates demands of justice. 
Statists tend to hold that principles of justice do not apply unless a certain condition holds, one 
that exclusively applies within states. Two proposed accounts of the normative peculiarity of the 6 
 
state are coercion-based statism, according to which what distinguishes membership in a state is 
its  coerciveness;  and  reciprocity-based  statism,  according  to  which  it  is  its  intense  form  of 
cooperation. Principles of justice then either apply, or they do not. 
However,  both  of  these  versions  face  the  challenge  that  forms  of  coercion  and 
cooperation also hold within the global order as such, which makes it problematic to argue that 
principles of justice only govern the relation among those who share a state. Different conditions 
create redistributive demands, and these conditions might occur in degrees or otherwise take on 
different forms. Coerciveness might be more or less profound or pervasive, and similarly for 
forms of cooperation. For instance, like the state the World Trade Organization (WTO) is both 
coercive and cooperative, but is so in very different ways than the state. Statists can respond by 
arguing that the normative peculiarity of the state is based on its particular kind of coerciveness 
or cooperativeness. In earlier work (Risse (2006)), I, for one, have accounted for the state’s 
coerciveness in terms of legal and political immediacy. The legal aspect consists in the directness 
and pervasiveness of law enforcement. The political aspect consists in the crucial importance of 
the environment provided by the state for the realization of basic moral rights, capturing the 
profundity of this relationship. However, assuming that something like my account succeeds in 
explaining what is morally special about shared membership in states, one must still wonder 
whether this account matters for justice, that is, can explain why principles of justice apply only 
among those who share a state. That is the point that globalists push at that stage of the debate.   
One way of making progress in light of the debate among statists and globalists is to deny 
that there is a single justice relationship in which any two individuals either do or do not stand. 
One  may  use  ―principles  of  justice‖  as  a  collective  term  for  different  principles  with  their 
respective ground and scope. Let us call non-graded or monist internationalism the view that 
principles of justice either do or do not apply, that they do apply within states, and thus among 
people who share membership in a state, and only then. Non-graded or monist internationalism is 
simply the same as statism. Introducing this additional terminology allows us to connect statism 
to  other  views  that  endorse  the  normative  peculiarity  of  the  state.  Coercion-based  and 
reciprocity-based statism are versions of monist or non-graded internationalism. 
Graded internationalism holds that different principles of justice apply depending on the 
associational (i.e., social, legal, political, or economical) arrangements. Graded internationalism 
allows for associations such as the WTO, the European Union, or the global order as such to be 7 
 
governed by principles of justice, but endorses the normative peculiarity of the state. Among the 
principles that apply within other associations we find weakened versions of principles that apply 
within states. For this reason I talk about graded internationalism in this case. I am lacking the 
space to motivate the graded view in detail here. Suffice it to say that all those who live, say, 
under WTO are tied to each other much more loosely than individuals who respectively share a 
state. It is therefore plausible to think that the principles of justice that hold within the WTO are 
weakened versions of those that hold within a state.  
However, now that we have introduced a non-monist view, we also must take seriously 
the idea that some grounds could be relational, whereas others would not be. We must consider 
the possibility that there is no deep conflict between relationism and nonrelationism. Perhaps 
advocates have respectively overemphasized facets of an overall plausible theory that recognizes 
both relationist and nonrelationist grounds. Integrating relationist grounds into a theory of justice 
pays  homage  to  the  idea  that  individuals  find  themselves  in,  or  join,  associations  and  that 
membership in some of them generates duties. Integrating nonrelationist grounds means taking 
seriously the idea that some duties of justice do not depend on the existence of associations. One 
obvious non-relational ground to add is common humanity. One view that develops these ideas 
could  be  called  pluralist  internationalism,  or  plainly  internationalism.  The  use  of  the  term 
―internationalism‖ for this position acknowledges the applicability of principles of justice outside 
of  and  among  (―inter‖)  states.  This  view  endorses  the  state’s  normative  peculiarity  (and 
articulates it the same way in which Risse (2006) did earlier), but recognizes multiple other 
grounds of justice, some relational (e.g., subjection to the global trade regime) and others not 
(e.g., common humanity). Respectively different principles are associated with these different 
grounds, all of which binding, say, for states and international organizations. Internationalism 
transcends the distinction between relationism and nonrelationism.  
Internationalism offers one way of preserving the plausible aspects of nonrelationism, 
globalism,  and  statism.  Obviously,  making  this  view  credible,  and  proving  its  fruitfulness, 
requires detailed discussions of its implications for a wide range of areas. The costs of making 
such a move are considerable because it gives up on the uniqueness of the justice relationship. 
One would also have to meet the challenge that such a pluralist view does not, one way or 
another, collapse into one of the original views.  
 8 
 
4. My defense of pluralist internationalism in On Global Justice accepts a twofold challenge: 
first,  to  show  why  statism,  globalism,  and  nonrelationism  are  insufficient  and  why  a  view 
combining  relational  and  nonrelational  grounds  is  promising;  and  second,  to  illustrate  the 
fruitfulness of my view by assessing constructively what principles are associated with different 
grounds. Altogether I explore five grounds. I recognize individuals as human beings, members of 
states, co-owners of the earth, as subject to the global order, and as subject to a global trading 
system. For common humanity, the distribuendum – the things whose distribution principles of 
justice are concerned with -- is the range of things to which a certain set of natural rights entitles 
us;  for  shared  membership  in  a  state,  it  is  Rawlsian  primary  goods  (rights  and  liberties, 
opportunities and powers, wealth and income, and the social bases of self-respect – all those 
things that people collectively bring about within a state); for common ownership of the earth, it 
is the resources and spaces of the earth; for membership in the global order, it is again the range 
of things to which a set of rights generates entitlements; and for subjection to the global trading 
system, it is gains from trade.  
I do not claim to have identified all grounds: membership in the European Union is a 
contender, or more generally, different forms of membership in transnational entities. Certain 
grounds stand out because human affairs render them salient before the background of political 
realities  and  philosophical  sensitivities.  ―Social  justice‖  demarcates  the  relevance  of 
membership. ―Global  justice‖ demarcates the salience of not  one but  several  grounds:  those 
mentioned and possibly others for which one must argue.    
One might worry that my approach brings under the purview of ―distributive justice‖ 
much that may  fit  under justice, but  not  distributive justice.  Indeed,  common humanity, for 
instance, does not stand in contrast to justice but is one ground. Thereby my view acknowledges 
an important truth in nonrelationism. The issues that I claim fall under distributive justice are 
tied.  The  connection  is  that  all  grounds  bear  on  the  distribution  of  something  that  is  both 
significant for individuals and salient at the political level, and that all claims based on different 
grounds  place  stringent  demands  on  states  and  other  agents.  It  is  possible  to  think  of 
humanitarian duties as opposed to justice for a narrowly conceived notion of justice. However, 
there is pressure to think of these duties as stringent, which renders this contrast uncompelling. 
Internationalism contrasts humanitarian with other duties of justice. There does remain some 9 
 
awkwardness  in  thinking  of  all  the  issues  in  this  book  in  terms  of  distributive  justice. 
Nonetheless, on balance, there is good reason to do so. 
We must take as given a global political order whose principal subdivisions consist of 
units roughly like the current state, but be open to the possibility that the best justification for 
doing so requires (possibly considerable) modifications in the norms of the system as we find 
them. We cannot pretend to be able to invent a global order from scratch. After starting with the 
state, we can ask what is normatively peculiar about it, and whether there ought to be states, as 
well as bring into focus the state’s duties to those outside it. But in particular we do not therefore 
need  to  agree  with  John  Rawls  that  there  are  principles  of  distributive  justice  that  apply 
domestically and must be articulated first, and that then there may well be other principles of 
justice (not distributive justice) that apply globally. Contrary to Rawls—and this is one major 
difference  between  his  approach  and  mine—I  argue  that  states  are  subject  to  principles  of 
distributive justice also on account of the other considerations reflected in the grounds-of-justice 
approach, and that there are several grounds of justice, of which some are relational and some are 
nonrelational. 
The emphasis throughout On Global Justice is on justifying the state to those respectively 
excluded from it. As far as the focus on the state is concerned, my work is aligned (e.g.) with that 
of John Rawls and David Miller, but differs from them especially in its emphasis on collective 
ownership, by supporting further-reaching duties outside of shared membership in a state based 
on other grounds of justice, and, as matter of general philosophical outlook, by seeking to justify 
states not merely to those respectively included in them, but also to those excluded. As far as the 
support for such duties and that goal of justifications of states are concerned, my work is aligned 
with that of cosmopolitans such as Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge, and Simon Caney, but differs 
from them again in its emphasis on collective ownership as well as in its vindication of the moral 
significance  of  the  state.  By  acknowledging  different  grounds  of  justice,  pluralist 
internationalism  preserves  valid  insights  from  all  those  approaches,  but  also  substantially 
diverges from each.  
What  is  indeed  most  distinctive  about  my  approach  is  the  significance  I  give  to 
humanity’s collective ownership of the earth. Thereby I revitalize and secularize an approach 
dominant in the 17
th century that has never again reached as much prominence, and that has 
largely (though not entirely) dropped out of sight since the Rawlsian Renaissance of political 10 
 
philosophy. Suppose the US population shrank to two, capable, however, of controlling borders 
through electronic equipment. Surely they should permit immigration. If so, we should theorize 
about the space humanity jointly inhabits, and about what entitlements there can be to parts of it. 
Such theorizing takes us to a suitable notion of collective ownership of the earth. In the 17
th 
century, the motivation for this approach was obvious: the Bible states that God gave the earth to 
humankind in common. Many questions could be addressed through an interpretation of that gift, 
such as concerns about the possibility of owning the sea and the conditions under which territory 
could legitimately be claimed. Philosophers such as  Hugo Grotius, John  Locke, and Samuel 
Pufendorf saw questions of collective ownership as central to their work. This approach is also 
present in international law, where for about forty years the term ―common heritage of mankind‖ 
has been applied to the high seas, the ocean floor, Antarctica, and Outer Space. Central questions 
include how to make sense of this ownership status without recourse to a divine gift, and how to 
select the philosophically preferred one from among different versions of it. Immigration is one 
topic  to  which  this  approach  applies.  Less  obvious  ones  include  human  rights,  as  well  as 
obligations towards future generations and obligations arising from climate change. At this stage, 
not only do we face problems of global reach, but humanity as a whole confronts problems that 
have put our planet as such in peril. It is therefore only appropriate to find a suitable place in 
moral and political philosophy for theorizing about all human beings’ symmetrical claims to the 
earth.   
Humanity’s  collective  ownership  of  the  earth  was  the  pivotal  idea  of  the  political 
philosophy of the 17
th century. European expansionism had come into its own, so questions of 
global reach entered political thought and needed to be addressed from a standpoint that was 
nonparochial (not essentially partial to one of their viewpoints) as far as European powers were 
concerned.  At  the  same  time,  appealing  to  God’s  gift  of  the  earth—as  reported  in  the  Old 
Testament—was  as  secure  a  starting  point  as  these  troubled  times  permitted.  Although  that 
debate  took  the  biblical  standpoint  that  God  had  given  the  earth  to  humankind,  some 
protagonists, such as Grotius and Locke, thought this matter was also plain enough for reason 
alone to grasp. And indeed, the view that the earth originally belongs to humankind collectively 
is plausible without religious input. We have much to gain from revitalizing this idea. What is at 
stake is ownership of, as John Passmore put it, ―our sole habitation . . . in which we live and 
move and have our being‖ (1974, 3), or in Henry George’s words, of ―the storehouse upon which 11 
 
[man] must draw for all his needs, and the material to which his labor must be applied for the 
supply of all his desires‖ (1871, 27). Or, as Hannah Arendt said in The Human Condition, ―The 
earth is the very quintessence of the human condition, and earthly nature, for all we know, may 
be unique in the universe in providing human beings with a habitat in which they can move and 
breathe without effort and without artifice‖ (1958, 2). 
 
5.  Now that I have introduced some of the main themes of On Global Justice let me go over it 
part by part and then chapter by chapter to give readers a more concrete sense of the train of 
thought the book develops. Part 1 primarily discusses the state, and thus shared membership in a 
state as a ground of justice, but that discussion also includes an account of common humanity as 
a  ground (chapters 2–4). Then part 2 explores  humanity’s  collective ownership of the earth 
(chapters 5–10). Part 3 turns to international structures, the global order and the international 
trade regime (chapters 11–14). Finally, I explore two remaining questions that arise from my 
view, both pertaining to institutions. First, I assess whether there ought to be a system of multiple 
states to begin with, and second, I explore how the state’s various obligations to bring about a 
just world mesh together, and start doing the same for global institutions (part 4, chapters 15–
18).  Throughout,  I successively develop  a theory of human rights,  to  the  extent required  to 
explain how such a theory fits into a theory of global justice. I fall short of offering a complete 
list of human rights. Chapter 4 introduces a conception of human rights as rights that persons 
have in virtue of the distinctively human life. Chapter 7 begins work toward another conception 
that understands such rights as membership rights in the global order. Collective ownership of 
the earth is one source of such rights. Chapter 11 continues the work on this conception and 
integrates the distinctively human life as another source of rights. The conception from chapter 4 
will therefore be fully integrated into the conception of human rights as membership rights in the 
global  order,  the  conception  I  propose  in  this  book.  Chapters  12  and  13  explore  how  my 
conception makes sense of certain human rights. 
Let  me  summarize  chapter  by  chapter.  In  part  1,  chapter  2  characterizes  shared 
membership in a state as a ground and explores how this characterization bears on the selection 
of domestic principles of justice. Chapter 3 elaborates on differences among my pluralist view, 
statism, and globalism  by looking at  contemporary debates involving statism and globalism. 
Together, chapters 2 and 3 establish the state’s normative peculiarity. They also show that the 12 
 
principles of justice that hold in a state are especially demanding (broadly egalitarian) principles 
of justice. Chapter 4 explores what justice requires in virtue of common humanity and defends 
my  pluralist  view  against  a  prominent  version  of  nonrelationism.  To  that  end,  I  develop  a 
conception of human rights that individuals hold in virtue of being human. The grounds in part 1 
are shared membership in a state and common humanity. Part 2 explores collective ownership of 
the earth. Since this approach is now uncommon, chapter 5 explores how one of its protagonists, 
Hugo Grotius, put it to work. Grotius is also a source of inspiration for my discussions of duties 
from climate change, in chapter 10, and of a human right to pharmaceuticals, in chapter 12. 
Chapter 6 systematically develops the idea that humanity collectively owns the earth, selecting a 
conception I call Common Ownership.  
Chapter 7 begins work on my conception of human rights as membership rights in the 
global order. Common Ownership is one source from which to derive such rights. Chapter 8 
applies the ownership approach to immigration, arguing that states can reasonably be expected to 
allow immigration to the extent that they are underusing their share of three- dimensional space. 
Chapter 9 explores how Common Ownership illuminates duties toward future generations, and 
chapter 10 assesses the implications of Common Ownership for duties resulting from climate 
change.  Part  3  turns  to  international  structures,  discussing  two  remaining  grounds,  shared 
membership in the global order and shared subjection to the global trading system. Thinking of 
membership in the global order as a ground of justice acknowledges that the earth is covered by 
a system of states and that there are international organizations that aim to be of global reach. 
World trade is highly structured and subject to numerous conventions. Involvement with the 
trading system too constitutes a ground. The trading system is part of that order. States too are 
parts of it. Nevertheless, particular principles of justice apply to them, and the same is true for 
the  global  trading  system.  Chapter  11  continues  to  develop  the  account  of  human  rights  as 
membership  rights  in  the  global  order.  Part  3  includes  two  studies  of  how  to  apply  this 
conception to questions of the sort, ―Is there a human right to X?‖ (Chapter 7 also offers one 
such  study,  concerning  the  question  of  whether  there  is  a  human  right  to  relocation  for 
inhabitants of disappearing island nations.) Chapter 12 explores whether there is a human right to 
essential pharmaceuticals. Chapter 13 assesses whether labor rights are human rights. Exploring 
the fifth  ground,  chapter 14 discusses  how  justice applies  to  trading.  Chapter 18, in  part 4, 
completes the discussion of trade by assessing the WTO.  13 
 
Parts 1–3 explore the different grounds. Taking internationalism as established, Part 4 
addresses  two  remaining  questions,  both  pertaining  to  institutions.  My  approach  makes  the 
normative peculiarity of states central, as well as the existence of a system of multiple states. But 
states exist only contingently. If it were morally desirable for the state system to cease to exist, 
then my theory of global justice could not offer us an ultimate ideal of justice. That ideal would 
be offered by a vision of the political arrangement that should replace the system of states. So we 
must explore whether it is true that morally there ought to be no system of states but instead there 
ought to be either no states or else a global state. Answering that question is also relevant to 
answering the two questions concerning justification posed earlier in chapter 1. If there ought to 
be no state system, then it cannot be justified to people subject to it. Chapter 15 considers several 
arguments  that find  fault  with  the way we live now, the system  of states. We explore four 
strategies one may deploy (a) to identify faults of the state system and (b) to use the identified 
moral failings to reach the conclusion that there ought to be no system of states, and thus no 
global  order.  Chapter  16  offers  a  sweeping  objection  to  any  attempt  to  argue  toward  the 
conclusion that the state system ought to cease to exist. There remains a nagging doubt about 
whether  there  ought  to  be  states  at  all;  nevertheless,  morally  and  not  merely  pragmatically 
speaking, we ought not abandon states now, nor ought we aspire to do so eventually. Chapters 17 
and 18 explore a question that we also encounter at several points throughout the book: what 
obligations do various institutions have to bring about a just world? In chapter 17 I focus on the 
state, drawing together the threads of my discussion and asking how the various obligations on 
the state to bring about a just world mesh together. In chapter 18 I begin the task of doing the 
same for global institutions by focusing on one, the WTO. In addition to questions of justice, we 
also encounter questions of accountability, on which I say a bit more now in what follows.  
 
6.  So  indeed,  then,  there  are  different  grounds  that  come  with  their  respectively  different 
principles of justice. For the shared membership in a state I assume that something like Rawls’s 
two  principles  of  justice  is  correct.  The  principles  I  argue  in  the  course  of  this  book  are 
associated with different grounds of justice are the following:  
(1) Shared membership in a state:  1. Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully 
adequate scheme of  equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same 
scheme of liberties for all. 2. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that 14 
 
they are both (a) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity and (b) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. 
 
(2) Common  humanity:  The  distribution  in  the  global  population  of  the  things  to  which 
human  rights  (understood  as  rights  needed  to  protect  the  distinctively  human  life) 
generate entitlements is just only if everyone has enough of them to lead a distinctively 
human life (and thus if those rights are satisfied).  
 
(3) Collective  ownership:  The  distribution  of  original  resources  and  spaces  of  the  earth 
among the global population is just only if everyone has the opportunity to use them to 
satisfy  her  or  his  basic  needs,  or  otherwise  lives  under  a  property  arrangement  that 
provides the opportunity to satisfy basic needs. 
 
(4) Membership in the global order: The distribution in the global population of the things to 
which human rights (understood as membership rights) generate entitlements is just only 
if everyone has enough of these things for these rights to be realized. 
 
(5) Trade: The distribution of gains from trade among states is just only if no country enjoys 
gains that have come at the expense of people involved with the trade, where these gains 
occur at the expense of certain people if either (a) their contributions to the production of 
goods or the provision of services for export do not make them better off (than if they 
were  not  producing  hose  goods  at  all)  to  an  extent  warranted  by  the  value  of  these 
contributions  (and  they  did  not  voluntarily  accept  such  an  arrangement),  or  (b)  their 
involvement in the trade has emerged through human rights violations, or both. 
 
I hope these principles are sufficiently intelligible for our purposes. A number of chapters in the 
book offer extensive commentary on them. 
Every agent and institution has the duty to do what it can, within limits, to bring about the 
necessary conditions of just distributions, as described in the principles of justice. The first task 
when asking how institutions (or any entity with obligations of justice) ought to contribute to 
justice is to ask, for which principles do they have this obligation to do what they can, within 
limits,  to  bring  about  justice?  The  second  question  is,  what  is the  priority  ranking  of  those 
principles for this institution? When talking about priority among principles, I do not have in 
mind  that  from  the  standpoint  of  the  universe,  achieving  justice  is  more  important  in  some 
distributions  than  in  others.  Such  a  standpoint  generates  no  priority  ranking  among  the 
principles. But we can ask whether for a given agent or institution charged with trying to bring 
about justice there is a priority among these principles. Institutions have particular purposes (that 
other entities may or may not also have), have limited time and resources, and have more power 
and competence to influence things in some areas than in others. They may plausibly also have 15 
 
their own concerns of justice that would not stand out from the standpoint of the universe but to 
which entities may show partiality in their execution of their general duty to do what they can to 
bring about justice. I assume all principles of justice can be satisfied at once within a world of 
multiple states. Given this assumption, the problematic aspects of granting a kind of partiality 
especially to states are much less troublesome than they otherwise would be. 
Let us say that ground G is embedded in H if the individuals in the scope of G are also in 
the scope of H. I introduce this notion to answer the question, for which principles of justice does 
an institution (e.g., the state) have corresponding obligations? I respond as follows. First, we find 
the ground G most closely linked with the institution (in the case of the state, the ground of state 
membership). A ground is ―linked‖ with an institution if the operations of the institution are 
primarily directed at, or most directly affect, the people in the scope associated with that ground. 
For instance, the operations of a state (or its government) are primarily directed at members of 
that state. We ask then what principles are associated with that ground, where a principle is 
associated with a ground if it either arises from the ground in the familiar way (e.g., as the 
Rawlsian principles arise from the ground of state membership) or arises from another ground in 
which the first ground is embedded. So this sense of a principle’s being associated with a ground 
is broader than what we are familiar with. Then we apply this rule: An institution has duties 
corresponding to all principles associated (in the broader sense) with the ground linked to the 
institution. This approach to deciding which principles an institution has duties to try to bring 
about is more restrictive than the view that entities with obligations of justice are responsible for 
all principles. States, for instance, have no obligations relating to Rawlsian principles in other 
states or, say, principles applying to people on another planet. 
As far as states are concerned, I submit the following list of principles of justice that 
ascribe obligations to states, in order of priority (which reflects my own considered judgment): 
 
1. Within the state, each person has the same indefeasible claim to an adequate scheme of 
equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for 
all. 
 
2. (a) The distribution in the global population of the things to which human  rights 
(understood  as  membership  rights)  generate  entitlements  is  just  only  if  everyone  has 
enough of them for these rights to be realized. (b) The distribution  of  original  resources 
and spaces of the earth among the global population is just only if everyone has the 16 
 
opportunity to use them to satisfy  her or his basic needs, or otherwise lives under a 
property arrangement that provides the opportunity to satisfy basic needs. 
 
(Principles 2(a) and 2(b) are at the same level of priority.) 
 
3. Within  the state, each person has  the same  indefeasible  claim  to  a  fully  adequate 
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of 
liberties for all. 
 
4. Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) attached to   
offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity, and (b) 
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. 
 
(4 (a) has priority over 4 (b).) 
 
Once again the discussions throughout a number of chapters in On Global Justice provide an 
extended commentary on their meaning and implications, especially for items 2 (a) and 2 (b), 
which  have  a  rather  complex  background,  and  also  have  implications  with  regard  to  future 
generations. But in this case too I hope that the statement is clear enough for present purposes. 
Two grounds do not appear on this list of principles as they apply to the state: common humanity 
and subjection to the trade regime. The implications of common humanity are subsumed under 2 
(a). To the extent that trade creates obligations for states pertaining to other states, they too are 
subsumed under 2 (a). To the extent that trade creates domestic obligations, they are subsumed 
under principle 4. This does not meant that trade does not generate demands of justice; it merely 
means that the principles on this list are sufficiently general to absorb these demands to the 
extent that they apply to states.  
Rawls’s first principle appears in two versions. Principle 1 omits the word ―fully.‖ States 
need not help improve the fates of noncitizens if circumstances do not allow them to realize a 
broadly adequate scheme of equal basic liberties for their citizens, but this scheme does not need 
to be fully adequate before obligations to help improve the fates of others apply. If citizens of a 
state are in a position to enjoy a broadly adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, the duties 
generated by principle 2 have greater importance than the provision of a fully adequate scheme 
of equal basic liberties. A certain level of deficiency in the realization of Rawls’s original first 
principle should not discourage states from doing their share for obligations under principle 2. 
Principle  3  restates  Rawls’s  first  principle,  including  the  word  ―fully,‖  to  capture  his  own 17 
 
prioritizing  of  his  principle  over  his  second  principle  (my  principle  4).  Principle  2  requires 
considerable policy changes vis-à-vis the status quo.  
In addition to principles of justice On Global Justice also argues for some demands of 
reasonable conduct that are weaker than the demands of justice. Those demands – which I again 
state without elaboration -- concern immigration policies and intergenerational equality: 
(α) Immigration: If the territory of state S is relatively underused, co-owners elsewhere 
have a pro tanto claim to immigration. 
 
(β) Intergenerational equality: Each generation can reasonably be expected to leave a 
nondeclining stock of natural capital behind (strong sustainability). 
 
(γ)  Absorptive  capacity:  Regulation  of  access  to  the  absorptive  capacity  of  the 
atmosphere ought to be done in terms of ideas of fair division. 
 
The grounds-of-justice approach dilutes the contrast between domestic and foreign policy. To 
ensure acceptability of the global order, governments can reasonably be expected to assume 
responsibility for a globally even-handed (and to some extent harmonized) immigration policy. 
Ensuring acceptability also requires the implementation of a climate change policy. Governments 
must not neglect duties with regard to immigration, climate change or future generations even if 
(given  current  policies)  discharging  such  duties  threatens  disproportionately  to  affect 
disadvantaged  segments  of  society.  Social  policy  must  be  reformed,  then,  and  especially 
domestic tax codes must be adjusted accordingly. Inheritance taxes and other taxes targeting the 
increasingly large share of the very wealthy in rich countries’ economies are particularly suitable 
sources of income that could help with discharging international duties. Governments must think 
of  matters  of  domestic  and  global  justice  together  rather  than  in  isolation  and  with  distinct 
priority for domestic matters.  
But  entities  like  the  state  do  not  only  have  obligations  of  justice  (and  of  reasonable 
conduct). They also have an additional duty to give account for what they do to realize their 
obligations of justice, and have this duty towards those who are in the scope of the relevant 
principles of justice. That is, an entity A with an obligation of justice to entity B owes an actual 
justification to B for what it does to realize this duty.  Such account giving may take on rather 
different forms depending on whether it involves immediate interaction between the parties in 
this relationship. Moreover, such account giving can be more or less effective, depending on 
(roughly speaking) whether the account recipient can impose sanctions on the account giver as 18 
 
appropriate and thereby set incentives for the account giver to make sure the duties in question 
are executed. Chapter 17 of On Global Justice argues in detail why the presence of obligations of 
justice implies obligations to give account. In a nutshell, there are two arguments. One is an 
argument from respect. Too much is at stake when claims of justice are under consideration. So 
respect for those to whom these particular duties are owed requires that an actual account be 
given. Arguments from respect are ubiquitous, but it is in the context of a theory of justice that 
they do real work. Furthermore, there is the instrumental argument that the requirement of an 
actual justification increases chances that justice will be done. 
 
7.  Within states, democratic mechanisms offer the appropriate form for governments to give 
account to its citizens for what they do to realize the principles of justice that only concern the 
members of the given society.  However, a government that is democratically accountable to its 
citizens for domestic justice has strong incentives to neglect other duties. The problem is not 
merely that the dynamics of electoral politics—the ability and willingness of political parties to 
make promises they can realize only by neglecting other duties—might occasionally interfere 
with other values. The real problem is that voters are preoccupied with their own concerns. 
Politicians cater to these preoccupations, running the risk of being penalized in elections if they 
fail to do so. This normally implies a high degree of political inward-directedness. To the extent 
that domestic politics seeks to realize justice, efforts focus on domestic principles. The problem 
we have detected concerns both the pursuit of justice as far as it involves noncitizens and the 
state’s ability to give account to them. Yet not only do governments have other duties, they are 
also  accountable  to  those  in  the  scope  of  other  principles  of  justice.  Thus  the  fact  that 
governments are accountable in this way for principles of domestic justice creates a challenge for 
finding accountability mechanisms related to other principles of justice. 
Since governments have a disincentive to give account to people other than their own 
citizens,  would  not  global  democracy  be  the  appropriate  accountability  mechanism?  For 
instance, the global population might elect representatives who would be ultimately accountable 
to them while states would be intermediately accountable to them. Another, more demanding 
possibility would be that noncitizens join citizens in having voting rights with respect to the 
government  of  each  state.  Each  government  would  be  ultimately  accountable  to  the  world 
population. 19 
 
However,  while  the  ideas  behind  democracy  apply  to  all  human  beings,  they  have 
institutional implications respectively only for appropriately organized groups, groups that share 
a  sense  of  common  destiny  and  communicate  with  one  another  on  issues  of  public  policy. 
Nonetheless,  in  recent  decades  much work has  been done to  explore whether some kind  of 
democratic  governance  would  be  appropriate  or  required  outside  of  states.  To  be  sure, 
cosmopolitan democrats do not generally seek to abandon states. They think of states as units 
within a multilayered governance system. That system includes intergovernmental institutions 
whose members are states, as well as cosmopolitan institutions that are ultimately accountable to 
all human beings on a ―one citizen, one vote‖ basis. World citizenship and national citizenship 
would coexist in a system of autonomous but complementary units. Representation in the UN 
and  elsewhere  should  be  strengthened.  Transnational  civil  society  and  especially 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) should participate in governance. 
One may muster a number of reasons  for a cosmopolitan democracy:  an appropriate 
consideration of the interests of all involved requires global democracy; democracy has bestowed 
more benefits than other forms of governments in domains in which it has been tried (city-states, 
territorial  states),  and  there  is  reason  to  think  that  this  will  be  true  at  the  global  level; 
international  society  is  already  thickly  institutionalized,  and  individuals  increasingly  have 
multilayered identities, corresponding to economic globalization. These potentially overlapping 
identities provide the basis for participation in global civil society. In due course, states will 
―wither  away,‖  the  demoi  of  domestic  politics  submitting  to  the  global  demos.  Crucially, 
cosmopolitan democrats might say that the current absence of a global demos does not affect 
their argument. A global demos does not need to precede global democratic institutions. Instead, 
their creation may help with the formation of such a demos. More plausibly, gradual reform 
toward global democratic institutions would also gradually lead toward a global demos. 
Cosmopolitan  democrats  are  partly  right.  On  the  one  hand,  justice  requires  
accountability, and requires it to be as effective as reasonably possible. Given the disincentives 
that democratic domestic politics creates for governments to pursue justice if it concerns only 
noncitizens, account giving to noncitizens is not sensibly placed into a domestic institutional 
framework.  It  is  as  far  as  these  matters  are  concerned  that  the  cosmopolitan  democrats  are 
correct. They are also correct that the absence of a global demos does not settle the question of 
how account giving should occur that does not merely address fellow citizens. But on the other 20 
 
hand, the results from chapter 16 of On Global Justice – which I presuppose now -- imply that 
we should not now aim for the kind of fundamental change involved in creating a global demos. 
Crucially, we do not understand a world with a global demos well enough to take a vision of 
such a world to be action guiding. The point is not merely that we should not seek to create such 
a world immediately, but that we should not now actively aim to create it at all, even step by step, 
given that we do not understand well enough what such a world would be like. We can of course 
simply stipulate that it would be a world with a global demos, much like in a mathematical 
model we can make any assumptions we like (as long as they are consistent), but we do not have 
enough historical and social scientific experience to tell us what kind of change steps we might 
take towards creating such a world would bring about, and thus what, taken altogether, such a 
world would be like. These results critically supplement the point that there currently is no global 
demos. Perhaps states will wither away, and we must then reconsider what counts as realistic 
utopia. But saying that  is strikingly  different  from now urging reforms designed to  create a 
global  demos.  We  must  find  ways  of  holding  states  accountable  for  such  matters,  short  of 
presupposing or aiming for a global demos.  
The considerations of the last paragraphs lead to the conclusion that it is international 
organizations or other entities of global administrative law that most plausibly create the context 
in which states give account to noncitizens for their contributions to justice. After all, domestic 
politics is not the right setting, nor is a form of global democracy.  Those entities would be 
transnational or even global in nature but would neither presuppose nor seek to bring about a 
global demos. In one way or another, they would critically involve states, or at least respect their 
presence.  At  the  same  time,  giving  account  within  such  entities  is  different  from,  and 
considerably  more  effective  than,  simply  giving  account  to  other  states  directly,  without  an 
institutional  framework  that  structures  the  relevant  activities  and  could  impose  sanctions. 
Similarly, giving account within such entities is more effective than giving account to NGOs that 
cannot enlist the sanctioning power of states. When we think about the design of such entities, 
we must be aware that centuries of learning about democracy teach little for global institutions. 
Those must go through a learning process that is entirely their own. 
 
8. We have now begun to discuss how international organizations enter into my theory of global 
justice. One important role they play is that they are the most plausible place where states can 21 
 
give account for how they go about certain obligations of justice that pertain to those who are not 
members of the state in question. Which international organization is best suited to be the place 
where such account giving occurs depends on the content of the duties in question. The WTO, 
for instance, is the natural place where states should give account for how they go about their 
obligations regarding matters of justice in trade. But there is more to be said about international 
organizations within the confines of my theory. Let me discuss these matters further using the 
WTO as an example.  
What duties of justice does the WTO have? Again, every institution has the duty to do 
what it can, within limits, to bring about the necessary conditions of just distributions. To answer 
the question of what duties the WTO has, the first step, in my pluralistic theory, is to ask, which 
of the various principles does the WTO have a duty to do what it can, within limits, to try to 
realize? As for states, we must ask whether there is a ground most closely linked with the WTO. 
This is (obviously) shared subjection to the global trading system. States have obligations to 
bring about justice in trade (see above for a statement of the relevant principle), and so does the 
WTO. In fact, the relationship between the WTO and this principle is parallel to that between 
states and the Rawlsian principles. We noted earlier that this principle of justice in trade drops 
out of the list of principles that apply to states—not because trade does not generate demands of 
justice but because the principles on that list are general enough to absorb them. But given the 
policy domain for which the WTO has been put in place, that is not the case here. Next we ask in 
which other grounds that first ground is embedded, and are directed to collective ownership of 
the earth, membership in the global order, and common humanity. We conclude that the relevant 
principles with regard to which the WTO has obligations are those associated with these four 
grounds.  
These results contradict views that limit the WTO to trade liberalization. Nonetheless, the 
extent to which the WTO must be guided by principles associated with those other grounds is 
bounded by what trade can achieve, which is an empirical question. Still, just as states cannot 
limit themselves to duties in virtue of shared membership, the WTO cannot ex ante limit itself to 
trade  regulation.  One  striking  consequence  of  the  result  that  the  WTO  has  duties  to  realize 
principles that have all of humanity in their scope is that the WTO has obligations to the citizens 
of nonmember countries as well as to those of member countries. The WTO is already officially 
concerned with more than trade or efficiency. The preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement talks 22 
 
about ―reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction 
of tariffs and other barriers to trade.‖ Yet these goals should be pursued ―with a view to raising 
standards of living, ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real 
income and effective demand,‖ as well as with a view to ensuring that ―developing countries, 
and especially the least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international 
trade commensurate with the needs of their economic development.‖ Limited as it is, moral 
language appears in the WTO’s mandate. This language ought to include justice. 
We can make another argument to assess what duties the WTO has when it comes to 
justice. Entities that are empowered by states and whose activities affect the satisfaction of the 
obligations to which states are subject ought to assist states with their duties. In virtue of having 
been founded by and receiving power from states, such entities are subject to demands of justice 
that apply to states, namely, those with regard to the domain for which they were founded. 
Therefore, the WTO ought to help states realize obligations they have in virtue of being involved 
with the trade system. What is important to note is that this implication also concerns purely 
domestic obligations of trade. We have yet to discuss how the WTO ought to be accountable, 
which adds demands on the organization. However, a commitment to justice ought to be added 
to the moral commitments in the mandate. Most important, given the set of principles of justice 
that internationalism advances, the WTO must have a human rights–oriented mandate. Since the 
view of human rights that I defend implies a duty of assistance in building institutions, the WTO 
also has a development-oriented mandate that derives from this human rights–oriented mandate. 
As we already noted, the organization devoted to  regulating trade is  also  the natural 
candidate within which states ought to account for their pursuit of fairness in trade, as well as for 
the  realization  of  other  principles  that  can  be  effectively  pursued  via  trade  instruments. 
Governments should participate in the WTO partly as account givers, partly as recipients qua 
representatives of their people. Within WTO structures, governments should explain how they 
seek to realize justice, subjecting themselves to scrutiny by other governments, WTO staff, and 
plausibly also NGOs or independent experts. States would be intermediately accountable to the 
WTO (which would be utilized to achieve effectiveness) but would ultimately be accountable to 
the global population. To be accountable to the WTO would mean to be accountable to other 
states organized within the WTO, but also to WTO staff and suitable NGOs. For instance, for the 
principle of justice in trade—that the distribution of gains from trade is just only if no country 23 
 
enjoys gains that have come at the expense of people involved with the trade—states should have 
to give periodic reports on whether or not their benefits from imports or exports are tainted in 
this way. WTO expertise should help determine what kind of gains would count as tainted. 
NGOs and independent experts may also help with the problem that many governments do not 
represent  their  people.  Care  must  be  taken  that  NGOs  increase  the  effectiveness  of  account 
giving rather than that of special interests. Effective account giving requires that the recipients be 
in a position to pass informed judgment and impose sanctions. Empowerment of poor members 
is essential, to make sure the WTO takes seriously its duties in pursuit of justice, and to make 
sure effective account giving occurs. Poor countries must have standing in the WTO. At least, 
they must be properly represented. This requires financial and logistical support, which richer 
members must provide.  
Inquiries into what we ought to do to realize justice may call for new institutions. For 
trade, there already exists an institution we can charge with some relevant tasks. The WTO is 
only  one  of  the  organizations  whose  role  we  must  reconsider  in  light  of  what  pluralist 
internationalism requires. And formal organizations are only one among several kinds of entities 
in global administrative law whose role in the realization of justice we must either reconsider or 
explore in the first place. This précis has only sketched a few themes from my own approach to 
these  questions  about  institutions  and  the  larger  context  of  global  justice  into  which  those 
questions are embedded. On Global Justice develops these themes in detail, and Global Political 
Philosophy offers an introduction to the field of political philosophy that makes questions of 
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